Abstract

In this paper, we develop a two-period model where we analyze and compare a hydro/thermal electrical system under different industrial organization: monopoly, Cournot competition and collusion; under storage constraint, water availability constraint and thermal turbine capacity constraint. First, we prove that the technological complementarity has an important role in satisfying electricity demand in the different industrial organizations. Second, we show by the analytical resolution, that intertemporal private monopoly water transfer from off-peak season to peak season is not as high as the same transfer under a public monopoly and therefore this increases the market price. Under Cournot competition, an increase in the peak season demand implies a water transfer strategy from off-peak to peak season. The results of collusion show that the electricity price is less dependent on the hydropower capacity. Keywords : Electricity market; Monopoly; Competition; Collusion; Hydro; Thermal. JEL Classifications : L20; Q40; Q25. DOI: https://doi.org/10.32479/ijeep.8775

Highlights

  • The market structure of the electricity sector has been characterized by natural monopolies

  • By the analytical resolution, we show that intertemporal private monopoly water transfer from off-peak season to peak season is not as high as the same transfer under a public monopoly and this increases the market price

  • We show that the technological complementarity has an important role in satisfying the electricity demand in the different industrial organizations

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Summary

INTRODUCTION

The market structure of the electricity sector has been characterized by natural monopolies. We use Ambec and Doucet (2003) framework to develop a two-period model where we analyze and compare a hydro/thermal electrical system under different industrial organizations: monopoly, Cournot competition and collusion; under storage constraint, water availability constraint and thermal turbine capacity constraint. We compare Cournot competition and collusion equilibriums and we show how the strategical water storage is used, in a collusive agreement, to increase the market price.

THE MODEL
MONOPOLISTIC STRUCTURE
Case of non-binding constraints Proposition 1
COMPETITION AND COLLUSION
If one of the H plant’s constraints is bounded
Case of non-binding constraints Proposition 3
Collusion
CONCLUSION
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