Abstract

In this paper, we analyze how parties form electoral coalitions in multiparty systems with mixed systems of representation. We stress that these electoral systems are created in the attempt to balance governance and representation by assigning a portion of the legislature's seats on the basis of plurality (PL) and the remaining seats on proportional (PR) basis. This is operationalized through double-ballot-voting: a PL ballot for the allocation of the seats won by the candidates in single-member-college races and a PR ballot for the proportional allocation of the remaining seats among the competing parties. The aim of the paper is to formulate a general theory to describe the electoral incentives that mixed electoral rules provide to political agents in multiparty systems. Italian 1994 and 1996 national elections are used as a case study to test the validity of our theory.

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