Electoral Rules and Bureaucratic Effectiveness

Abstract

Literature on comparative institutions shows that electoral and constitutional rules affect the behavior of politicians, while the literature on political control of bureaucracies demonstrates how politicians exercise control over bureaucracies and affect their performance. This article explores how electoral rules affect bureaucratic effectiveness. In particular, I hypothesize that personal vote‐seeking incentives drive legislators to specialize in legislative committees to develop their personal reputations. Once legislators specialize in legislative committees, they are in a better position to increase bureaucratic effectiveness. Drawing on the World Bank index of bureaucratic effectiveness, this article finds significant associations between the personal vote‐seeking incentive, legislative specialization, and bureaucratic effectiveness. However, these associations are restricted to presidential systems, where the separation of powers makes legislative specialization in committees a key mechanism for effective bureaucratic oversight.Related Articles Kostadinova, Tatiana, and Barry Levitt 2014. “.” Politics & Policy 42: 490‐512. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/polp.12081/full Kinyondo, Abel, and Riccardo Pelizzo. 2013. “.” Politics & Policy 41 (): 420‐446. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/polp.12020/abstract Levitt, Barry, and Tatiana Kostadinova. 2014. “.” Politics & Policy 42: 513‐547. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/polp.12084/abstract Related Media . http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home . http://polisci.berkeley.edu/people/person/m-steven-fish