Electoral fraud and the paradox of political competition

Abstract

ABSTRACT Why are some elections more fraudulent than others? While much work has been devoted to understanding the structural conditions under which election quality can suffer, little is currently understood about election-specific dynamics that shape the conduct of polling day. This study assesses the impact of a more proximate determinant of election day fraud: the anticipated closeness of the race. In doing so, the paper sheds light on a potential paradox of political competition; highly competitive elections are seen as a healthy sign of democratic functioning, yet they may also lead to a reduction in the integrity of the process. Using novel pre-election polling data for 109 presidential elections around the world between 1996 and 2016, results suggest that ex ante closeness incites electoral fraud. In democratic contexts, closer elections – and elections in which the incumbent’s prospects are ambiguous – are associated with greater levels of ballot box manipulation as attempts are made to get over the finish line. This is the case largely irrespective of whether the incumbent is marginally ahead or behind in the race, suggesting that it is the mere uncertainty of the election result that can encourage election day fraud.