Abstract
All polities may be judged against an ideal of electoral “efficiency” defined as responsiveness to the collective-goods preferences of the majority of the electorate. An index of efficiency permits a visual representation of where any democratic system falls in each of two dimensions, interparty and intraparty. Deviation from the “efficient” ideal encourages politicians to cater to parochial interests at the expense of broad policy preferences. Recent electoral reforms in four countries (Italy, Japan, New Zealand and Venezuela) represent moves away from electoral systems that represented different extreme deviations from efficiency.
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