Electoral Cycles in Fiscal Rules: International Empirical Evidence

Abstract

Abstract Using panel data from 99 countries over the period of 1985–2020, this study aims to uncover that fiscal rules work in electoral cycles. The results show that fiscal rules are less likely to be implemented in the pre-election year. We also find that this loosening in fiscal rules is especially prominent in cases when the incumbent political party can wield significant political power, where countries are less developed economically and politically, and where the management of fiscal rules is more likely to be exposed to discretionary interventions. Our findings are aligned with the opportunistic political budget cycles, in which politicians exploit fiscal policies and systems to serve their own political incentives. These results suggest that even fiscal rules, which are designed to prevent political pressure, are also subject to political process. (JEL codes: D72, D78, E32, E62, H11, and H60).