Electoral contests in the aftermath of military coups: how domestic constraints motivate praetorian conduct

Abstract

ABSTRACT Inspired by recent studies about the effects of coups on future regime trajectories, the article examines the conduct of praetorian armies in electoral contests that occur in the aftermath of military coups. In some countries, putschist militaries refrain from interfering in post-coup elections and withdraw from executive power. In others, they rig elections in favour of their preferred candidate and become entrenched in executive power. In each outcome, coup makers play a different role in subsequent regime dynamics. To explain these different outcomes, the article designs an integrative framework and applies it to countries displaying different post-coup electoral outcomes over time. The findings reinforce skepticism about the democratisation potential of militaries and highlight the importance of intra-military factionalism on praetorian leaders. The article encourages scholars to engage in case-based and processual research linking coup makers to long-term regime dynamics and provides hypotheses guiding such research agendas.