Abstract
AbstractElectoral institutions shape the incentive that elected representatives have to cultivate a personal vote, a geographically concentrated personal vote in particular. But are electoral institutions able to make representatives do what they would not do otherwise and to make them not do what they otherwise would have done? Using data from the cross-national partirep MP survey, it is demonstrated that electoral institutions shape elected representatives’ local orientation. That local orientation decreases as district magnitude grows – regardless of what representatives think about political representation. But representatives’ conceptions of representation do shape their uptake in the legislative arena from their contacts with individual constituents. The effect of the electoral incentive grows stronger as elected representatives think of representation as a bottom-up rather than a top-down process.
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