Abstract

Background: Elections in nondemocratic settings are expected to play a regime sustaining role and a regime subverting role. Recent research finds that these two seemingly competing views are not mutually exclusive, but rather complementary with each other. This is the case because the regime subverting role of elections is at work in the short run, whereas the regime sustaining role operates in the long term. In this paper, I argue that these effects are conditional on the nature of competition in those elections. Specifically, I contend that these effects that derive from the informational role of elections do not emerge when opposition forces boycott the elections. Methods: Using data from 262 nondemocratic regimes in 116 countries from 1946 to 2007, I examined (1) whether holding multiparty elections with ex ante competition increases the risks of authoritarian breakdowns; (2) whether holding multiparty elections without opposition boycott increases the risks of authoritarian breakdowns in the short term; and (3) whether holding multiparty elections without opposition boycott decreases the likelihood of authoritarian breakdowns in the long run. Results: First, only legislative elections with ex ante competition are found to increase the probability of authoritarian breakdowns. Second, both presidential and legislative elections increase the likelihood of authoritarian breakdowns in the short term only if viable opposition candidates or parties compete. Lastly, both presidential and legislative elections decrease the chances of authoritarian breakdowns in the long run, but this effect is present only when viable opposition do not boycott the elections. Conclusions: The regime subverting role and the regime sustaining role of elections in nondemocratic settings can be contaminated by the absence of opposition forces. This paper suggests a need to further scrutinize the nature and quality of elections when assessing their impact on the survival of nondemocratic regimes.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call