Election Re-Running and the Nature of Constitutional Choices: The Case of Italian Electoral Reform

Abstract

Two approacheshave been used in the literature to describe the nature and theprocess of unanimous constitutional choices in parliamentarydemocracies. The first approach suggests that unanimity in constitutionaldecisions derives from political compromises (Nohlen 1984, 1986;Shugart 1992). The second approach is based on the idea thatunanimity results from constitutional decision making from behinda veil of ignorance or uncertainty (Brennan and Buchanan 1985;Buchanan and Congleton 1998). In this study we argue that neitherof these two descriptions (compromise and veil of ignorance)is appropriate in defining the process of constitutional decisionmaking concerning electoral reforms. It is rather a mixture ofinterests' identification of the former (compromise) and uncertaintyconditions of the latter (veil of ignorance) which leads towardunanimous agreement in decisions regarding the design of a newsystem of representation. The case of Italian electoral reformand the results of an electoral simulation exercise with datafrom the 1996 election for the Italian Chamber of Deputies confirmour hypothesis. Our findings have some implications for the typeof assembly to be formed in cases of electoral system's reform.