Election Manipulation in Russia

Abstract

Since roughly the year 2000, corresponding with Vladimir Putin’s first election to the presidency, the integrity of elections in Russia has trended steadily downward. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation, once a lively opposition party, has been mostly co-opted. Regional governors, who made a play for power in 1999, have become firmly integrated into the “power vertical” with its peak in the Kremlin. Genuine, independent opposition groups and individuals face increasing legal risks, and the most independent media voices have been shut down or driven out of the country. The legal electoral framework, including the electoral system and laws concerning party registration and ballot access, has been adjusted over time to suit the needs of the ruling party. On election day, large-scale fraud is common in several regions, while more dispersed forms of manipulation (like voter pressure) are common elsewhere. The increasingly constrained electoral environment follows the deliberate consolidation of post-Soviet Russia’s patronage resources—the positions and institutions that enable their holders to distribute rewards and punishments to their clients—under the Kremlin’s control. At the same time, active civil society groups, opposition parties, and independent media have been able to impose costs on election-manipulating agents. As a result, despite a nationally consolidating authoritarian regime, areas of relatively freer elections have persisted over time. In these regions, more covert and dispersed forms of manipulation are the norm. New tools implemented after the COVID-19 pandemic, including electronic voting, may reshape the system by removing risks to election-manipulating agents and severely compromising electoral observation. Throughout the evolution of the system, the opposition remains inventive and has innovated its tactics alongside those of the ruling party.