Election Fraud and Political Survival of Subnational Actors: A Case of Russia

Abstract

The political survival of governors in Russia largely depends on their ability to address the Kremlin's electoral needs during the federal elections. To ensure their own political survival and address Kremlin's electoral needs, the governors can resort to election fraud in both parliamentary and presidential elections. This research aims to study the degree to which election fraud helps governors to extend their terms in office by analyzing three major periods: 2000-2005 electoral period, when the governors were elected by their regional electorate; 2005-2012 appointment period, when the governors were appointed by the Kremlin; 2012-present post-appointment electoral period, when the gubernatorial elections were restored. In this paper I develop the theory of gubernatorial survival in Russia, formulate research hypotheses and test said hypotheses using a Cox proportional hazards model, which includes finite mixture estimates and last digits in percentages tests as primary measures of election fraud.