Abstract
The paper investigates various arguments in favour of Putnam's internal realism with respect to the empirical sciences. In Models and Reality (1980), Putnam applies his model-theoretic argument to physics in order to defend a pragmatist view of truth. But this view of truth depends on the God's Eye View which Putnam criticizes with the same argument. In addition, it seems to be incompatible with any realistic account of science. In Realism with a Human Face (1990), Putnam introduces the distinction of meta-language and object lenguage. This distinction permits him to maintain the correspondence view of truth, and supports the actual pluralism of the empirical sciences. In Words and Life (1994), his internal realism is supported by anti-reductionist arguments which confirm the disunity of science.
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