“Either a Hermeneutical Consciousness or a Critical Consciousness”: Renegotiating Theories of the Germany-India Encounter

Abstract

In his 1973 essay Hermeneutics and Critique of Ideology, Paul Ricoeur articulates demands of human sciences by recalling what he referred to as the fundamental gesture of philosophy: this gesture an of historical conditions to which all human understanding is subsumed under of finitude? Or rather is it, in last analysis, an act of defiance, a gesture, relentlessly and indefinitely turned against false consciousness, against distortions of human communication which conceal permanent exercise of domination and violence? ... What is at stake can be expressed in terms of an alternative: either a or a consciousness. (63) Ricoeur identifies first attitude, hermeneutical consciousness, with Gadamer, who conceived tradition, context, and prejudices (qua pre-judgments, or Vorurteilen) as basic coordinates of human understanding. Instead of trying to escape these conditions, theory offers an avowal of the of finitude. Understanding Other (a text, a culture, past, etc.) only occurs because we interpret from within a historical moment, from standpoint of a particular with its own construction of authority and meaning, and practice of interpretation unfolds in dialogical fashion, allowing a gradual accumulation of ever-adjustable truths. Misapprehensions, it should be said, are affirmed as part of this dialogical process as interpreter reintegrate^] misunderstanding into understanding by very movement of question and answer (83). In his essay Ricoeur associates opposing view, approach of critical consciousness, with Habermas, though it surely evokes past modern masters of suspicions (Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud) and, by extension, more recent theorists such as Gramsci, Benj amin, and Foucault. According to Ricoeur, critical consciousness lodges a protest against reign of finitude, often in cause of lifting veil on the permanent exercise of domination and violence. (1) The tradition that dictates expanse of our circle is in fact product of underlying forces, like economic interest, sexual drive, or will to power; criticism has power to unmask these ideologically frozen dependencies (82), which is a crucial step in freeing ourselves from repression, injustice, and exploitation that they often enforce. As a consequence, critical consciousness insists--in contrast with model--that distortions in communication and understanding are always related to repressive action of an authority and therefore to violence (83). Ricoeur's scheme illuminates dynamics that have been at work within humanities and social sciences for several decades. His formulations are particularly helpful, however, when we consider recent work on encounter between European intellectuals and cultural artifacts (texts and data) of non-Western, largely colonized lands. Within this broader frame, post-Enlightenment reception of South Asian culture, texts, and thought in German-speaking lands has emerged as a challenging area of investigation. And here too Ricoeur's observations identify a significant theoretical rift in scholarship, one that I plan to trace in this article. But I also aim to chart out some new territory. Indeed, by drawing bright lines between hermeneutical consciousness and critical consciousness, I wish neither to over-simplify nor to call for an either/or decision in our historical investigation of India's place in German imagination. In fact, Ricoeur himself questioned his categories almost as soon as he offered them: Is it not alternative itself which must be challenged? it possible to formulate a hermeneutics which would render justice to critique of ideology, which would show necessity of latter at very heart of its own concerns? …