Egyptian investment in the Sudan: ‘assistance or exploitation?’

Abstract

The Condominium era of Sudanese history, 1899-1956, provides scholars with a unique opportunity to examine the complexities of nationalist movements. Because of prior Egyptian governance of the region, because Egypt financed and provided most of the military support in the reconquest, and because claims of restoring Egyptian control of the Sudan were useful in deflecting European criticism of British expansion in Africa, Egypt and the United Kingdom would share responsibility for administering the Sudan. However, Egyptian leaders maintained that this 'dual control' was a temporary measure masking their rightful sovereignty over the region. The following study is an examination of the Egyptian nationalist movement's aims and activities in the Sudan. During the inter-war period Egyptian nationalists claimed and sought to further develop a multitude of historic, linguistic, religious, and cultural ties with the Sudan. Strong economic ties, firmly binding Egyptian and Sudanese regions, would be the final piece in a formidable case to be laid before British or international diplomats when the sovereignty issue was addressed. Egypt's elite during the 1930s and 1940s increasingly believed that investment in the Sudan was an essential element in the nationalist cause. This article will determine which fields of investment piqued the greatest Egyptian interest, why such activities ultimately failed, and address the question of whether or not success in a specific field of investment would have furthered the general sovereignty objective of the Egyptian nationalist movement. From the moment the Condominium agreement was signed in 1899, the prospect of increased Egyptian activities, investment or otherwise, seemed dim, as it was clearly apparent that British officials actually ruled the country. British governors-general administered the Sudan under martial law in the first decades of the new regime. Egypt's limited administrative presence was drastically curtailed in the aftermath of the 1924 murder of Sudanese governor-general and Sirdar of the Egyptian army, Sir Lee Stack. Furthermore, in the inter-war period British officials in the Sudan began a policy of 'native administration' that was designed to rely on Sudanese