Abstract

The literature on economic determinants of democratization has identified most importantly the effects of economic development and income distribution. In this regard, Egypt had exhibited higher average incomes and declining inequality between 1999 and 2012. However, by 2015, the level of income inequality had reverted near its level in 2008. Although income distribution data are not available for later years, trends in the composition of economic activity suggest that income inequality has likely continued to increase, disempowering the middle class further and contributing to de-democratization. A main puzzle during the build-up to the Arab Spring revolts of 2010-11 was the fact that income inequality in Tunisia and Egypt was relatively low in comparison to countries at similar stages of economic development. Especially for Egypt, this analysis had ignored the vast between-country and within-oil-exporting-country income inequalities, which, according to WID.world scholars' calculations, had rendered the Middle East the most unequal region in the world. Post-2011 trends have simultaneously integrated Egypt more closely with Gulf economies and transformed the Egyptian economy more closely to follow the investment patterns of the latter. Thus, the short-lived economic trends that fueled demands for democratization in Egypt have been reversed, underpinning the regression of her political system to resemble more closely those of her Gulf benefactors. Although large investments in infrastructure may potentially lead to enhanced productivity and economic re-empowerment of the middle class, past experiences of Gulf economies to which the Egyptian economy is converging suggest otherwise.

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