Egypt's 1948 invasion of Palestine

Abstract

The invasion of Palestine by the Egyptian army on 15 May 1948 was a most unusual act: unusual not so much because of the exceptional difficulties which faced the invading force as for the invasion's unique background. Unlike the invasions by the other Arab armies, the one carried out by the Egyptian army reflected a sudden and unexpected change in Egypt's policy towards the Palestine conflict. This policy change was so sudden that it took by surprise a large number of Egyptian politicians, diplomats and highranking military commanders. Thus, for example, Muhammad Husayn Haykal, President of the Senate, disclosed in his memoirs that he had learned of the army's invasion only three days before it was carried out. At that date, he wrote, 'I was sitting in my office when suddenly [Muhammad Fahmi] an-Nuqrashi Pasha [Egypt's Prime Minister] walked in and requested to talk with me in private. When we remained alone he asked me to summon the Senate for a secret session in which the Government would present its decision to send the Egyptian forces into Palestine to fight the Jews, I was completely surprised'.' Haykal was by no means the only surprised politician. Abd al-Rahman Azzam, Secretary General of the Arab League, was also taken aback by the Egyptian invasion. On 13 May 1948, Azzam told Syrian Prime Minister Shukri al-Quwati that Egypt would not invade Palestine. Azzam himself learnt of the Egyptian invasion only a day later, when King Abdullah of Trans-Jordan personally disclosed the information to him.2 The decision to invade Palestine also caught by surprise the Chief of Staff of the Egyptian army, and other senior Egyptian commanders who had strongly opposed it maintaining that the army was ill-equipped and ill-trained for such a formidable operation.3 Foreign intelligence sources who followed Egyptian politics very closely and believed they had a full understanding of the Egyptian arena were equally astonished. Thus, for example, as late as 13 May 1948, Ya'akov Shim'oni, Deputy-Director of the Arab Section of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, doubted whether the Egyptian army would invade Palestine. In a meeting of the Arab Section, Shim'oni concluded that information concerning the prospective Arab invasion was confusing. French intelligence officers operating from Beirut had informed the Arab Section that Arab preparations for a military invasion of Palestine were mere bluff. Yet, on the previous day, these very sources had insisted that the Arabs were preparing a 'Blitzkrieg' against the future Jewish state. Summing up his own impressions, Shim'oni expressed the certainty that the Arab Legion and the Iraqi army would enter Palestine. 'As for the Egyptians', he continued, 'it seems that they would provide finances and advice, while concentrating their forces on the border. It is possible, but not certain, that the Egyptians might invade too'.4