Abstract

This paper analyzes the effect of a number of institutional arrangements in a centrally-planned economy on the voluntary determination of work effort in a producer cooperative. The different arrangements are compared in terms of (i) degree of egalitarianism associated with the implementation of maximal output, (ii) level of equilibrium output given a particular distributive system, and (iii) the potential for securing equilibrium.

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