Efland on the Aesthetic and Visual Culture: A Response

Abstract

Arthur Efland's attempt (2004) to find a middle ground between what he calls two rival versions of art education-in effect aesthetic education and visual culture-is both welcome and needed. His notion of the entwined nature of aesthetic experience and his discourse on the quandaries of visual culture are well worth consideration by those seeking to assess the relative merits of each approach. His rescue operation to salvage the idea of aesthetic experience reflects a tendency evident in a number of current writers (e.g. Carroll, 2000; Moore & Eaton, 2002; de Bolla, 2001) who hold that too much of value is lost by attempts to expunge the concept from serious discussion about art and art education. Efland's critique of visual culture is important not only because he personally endorses a qualified notion of visual culture but also because he raises key questions about the premises of the approach. Given the limited space allowed commentaries by Studies, I cannot do justice to all of Efland's topics. My response is thus restricted to (1) his discussion of my early writings on excellence and aesthetic experience, including some remarks on his notion of the entwining of aesthetic experience, and (2) his critique of visual culture.On Excellence, Aesthetic Experience, and Art EducationI very much appreciate Efland's positive remarks about my writings and the role he thinks they have played in thinking about art education. He agrees with me that aesthetic considerations are important in understanding and appreciating works of art and that the study of outstanding works of art should occupy a significant place in art education. These positions are featured in my early as well as my later work.Although Efland believes that the idea of aesthetic experience is worth preserving, he does not think it should be the sole aim of art education or that aesthetic experiences of works of art should be limited to the perception of their formal qualities and stylistic features. Efland has sometimes suggested that I hold such views, but he now acknowledges that my thinking on such matters is more subtle and complex and hence undeserving of some of the vituperation directed against it. ι I tried to allay doubts on that score in an article on my writings about excellence (Smith, 1998). There I unequivocally stated that I am not now, nor have I ever been, a formalist in matters of art-words, moreover, that were highlighted by the editor of the issue in question. This is not to say, of course, that I hold formal features to be unimportant; it is impossible even to conceive of a work of art without them.Efland's chief reference to my work is Excellence in Art Education (Smith, 1987). In that book I suggest that the purpose of art education lies in the development of a disposition to appreciate the excellence of works of art for the sake of the aesthetic experiences they are capable of affording. This assertion has led some to think that I'm indifferent to lesser works and popular culture in general. But while it would be ludicrous to insist that only great works should be studied in art education or that the sole function of artworks is the provision of aesthetic experiences, it remains true that serving as occasions for aesthetic experiences is one thing that works of art often do very well, regardless of other functions they obviously can and do perform. It would be especially inappropriate to concentrate wholly on the study of masterpieces in the beginning yeats of schooling when learning to pay attention to the basics of art is the most important objective. Efland neglected to mention that my early discussion of excellence was a response made on behalf of the NAEA to reports published in the 1980s that were meant to apply to secondary education. What is more, a look at the curriculum scheme I set out for the secondary years in the early version (Smith, 1987) encompasses more than the study of exemplars. And my discussion of elitism and populism in the same issue (and in later volumes) mentions the virtues of both beneficent elitism (access to excellence for all) and beneficent populism (a recognition of the aesthetic values of everyday life) which suggests the possibility of accommodating the study of traditional masterworks along with works of popular culture. …