Efficient SFC Protection Method against Network Attack Risks in Air Traffic Information Networks

Abstract

With the continuous development of the civil aviation industry toward digitalization and intelligence, the closed architecture of traditional air traffic information networks struggles to meet the rapidly growing demands for air traffic services. Network function virtualization (NFV) is one of the key technologies that can address the rigidity of traditional air traffic information networks. NFV technology has facilitated the flexible deployment of air traffic services, but it has also expanded the attack surface of the network. In addressing the network attack risks faced by service function chains (SFCs) in NFV environments, a SFC protection method based on honeypots and backup technology (PBHB) is proposed to reduce the resource cost of protecting air traffic information networks while enhancing network security. Initially, PBHB utilizes the TAPD algorithm to deploy the primary VNFs as closely as possible to the shortest path between the source and destination endpoints, thus aiming to reduce SFC latency and save bandwidth resource costs. Subsequently, the RAHDR algorithm is employed to install honeypot VNFs in each physical platform that is at risk of side-channel attacks, thus updating the deployment status of honeypot VNFs in real time based on the VNF lifecycle in order to offer primary protection for SFCs. Lastly, the BDMPE algorithm was used to calculate the backup scheme with the highest protection efficiency to implement secondary protection for the SFCs that still do not meet the security requirements. Through experiments, the maximum backup limit for SFCs in PBHB was determined, confirming its satisfactory performance across various SFC arrival rates. Furthermore, performance comparisons with other SFC protection methods revealed that PBHB achieves optimizations in resources cost while ensuring SFC security and latency.