Abstract

This study identifies a participant attack vulnerability in Li et al.’s SQPC protocol. The participant attack allows a malicious participant, Bob, to obtain the participant Alice’s secret information by intercepting and measuring photons sent to Alice, and later decrypting Alice’s encrypted comparison result. An improved SQPC protocol is proposed to address this problem. The key enhancement is introducing a mutual eavesdropping check requiring the third party and participants to verify they obtain the same photon measurement results. This enables detecting participant attacks like the one identified. The SQPC protocol proposed in this study not only withstands attacks from internal participants but also achieves quantum efficiency almost equivalent to Li et al.’s SQPC protocol. Thus, this study presents a more secure SQPC protocol without compromising quantum efficiency.

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