Abstract
This contribution shows that high-efficiency coordination via strategy sorting is possible even within a modest number of rounds and with minimal informational feedback. The results of our study challenge one of the widely established mechanisms to enhance coordination on high-efficiency equilibria, i.e. making them more “attractive” relative to lower efficiency equilibria (Devetag and Ortmann, 2007). In our study we show that there exist conditions under which the opposite is true, that is the more attractive the safer option is, the easier is to coordinate on high efficiency equilibria.
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