Efficiency, Equity, and Budgetary Policies

Abstract

The standard decision rules of cost-effectiveness analysis either require the decision maker to set a threshold willingness to pay for additional health care or to set an overall fixed budget. In practice, neither are generally taken, but instead an arbitrary decision rule is followed that may not be consistent with the overall budget, lead to an allocation of resources that is less than optimal, and is unable to identify the program that should be displaced at the margin. Recent work has shown how mathematical programming can be used as a generalization of the standard decision rules. The authors extend the use of mathematical programming, first to incorporate more complex budgetary rules about when expenditure can be incurred, and show the opportunity loss, in terms of health benefit forgone, of each budgetary policy. Second, the authors demonstrate that indivisibility in a patient population can be regarded as essentially a concern for horizontal equity and represent this and other equity concerns as constraints in the program. Third, the authors estimate the different opportunity costs of a range of equity concerns applied to particular patient populations, and when imposed on all patient populations. They apply this framework of analysis to a realistic and policy-relevant problem.