Abstract

AbstractIf fixed costs are endogenous, following from profit maximization, horizontal mergers are always profitable. They cause the price to rise and consumer surplus to decrease. A case of horizontal merger in which, according to the requirement of US and EU Merger Guidelines for an efficiency defense to be acceptable, the price declines or remains constant does not exist and therefore cannot be expected by profit maximizing partners to arise following a merger. Merger control should be guided by focusing on total welfare. Permitting cooperation in R&D, although profitable, is likely to be detrimental to welfare.

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