Efficiency-based multi-item bargaining design in cognitive radio networks with spectrum coordination

Abstract

This paper studies the spectrum sharing problem with coordination-generated wireless resource for cooperative cognitive radio networks. A new alternating-offer spectrum bargaining framework is introduced with asymmetrically bilaterial wireless resource, in terms of sequential bargaining equilibria for frequency bands for high efficiency or approximate efficiency. In the proposed framework, the role of spectrum bargaining with user diversity can constrain many items with private information for spectrum allocation, thereby aggregating to a current frequency band surplus with spectrum trading to exchange the use in the reform of spectrum regulatory practice. While the users have an incentive in agreeing on a division of resource, they also have an interest in maximizing the amount of resource that it received. Furthermore, we develop an efficiency-based algorithm to explain why spectrum bargaining based on asymmetrical resource information can get little deviation from the first best resource utilization for high efficiency consideration. Simulation results show that the proposed multi-item spectrum bargaining scheme significantly outperforms the existing schemes.