Abstract
While the efficiency of certain contractual choices has been well established, less attention has been given to the distributional outcomes of contracting in natural resource-based industries. Data from a case study of seed gatherers in Honduras demonstrates that workers paid under a relative payment system receive an earnings premium of about 25%, of which 40% cannot be explained by observed differences in worker productivity. A theoretical agency model is outlined in the appendix to explain why workers under tournaments necessarily enjoy a higher return than those under piece-rates, implying a more skewed income distribution as suggested in the efficiency wage literature.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
