Abstract
This paper examines the effect of improved transparency in the bidder qualification process, using the experience gained from a case study of municipal public works auctions. A difference-in-differences analysis reveals that improved transparency reduces procurement cost by up to 8%. This finding is robust with regard to the concerns of both endogeneity and sample selectivity. The bidding-function estimates, combined with features of Japanese procurement system, imply that the introduction of transparent practices is insufficient to bring about efficiency in public procurement.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
