Effects of racial profiling: the subjectivation of discriminatory police practices

Racial profiling is currently in the Czech Republic relatively an unknown term or a term connected with negative connotations. Profiling is a standard method of policing, however, it is also necessary to draw attention to the facts when this method may lead to racial or ethnic profiling. Unless relevant reasons are given for racial and ethnic profiling, this may be a discriminatory practice by the police authorities. In the Czech Republic, the issue of racial profiling is given rather negligible attention. There are only a few professional articles that do not address the issue of racial profiling as a complex phenomenon. Profiling itself can be seen as a legitimate and useful tool in identifying people who may be committing crimes, for example by concealing prohibited articles or likely to commit crimes in the future. This way of profiling must be based on professional assumptions resulting from behavioral training, not on racial, ethnic, or religious characteristics. Members of specific security forces can thus work with profiles that allow them to search for people who repeatedly visit specific places or, for example, make large purchases exclusively for cash. In the case of purely profiling, the profiles are less likely to be assessed as discriminatory based on race, ethnic origin, or religion.

Racial Profiling

Encounters between the public and the police are highly stressful and contested events. In a multicultural society such as Canada, freedom from discrimination and arbitrary treatment are core values worthy of protection. Investigation by law-enforcement officials may give rise to allegations of racial profiling, a practice that jeopardizes those values. Yet, intelligence-led law enforcement is a matter of practical importance, recognized widely by the community as desirable. So, police use of criminal intelligence to structure investigative practices should be encouraged, but not at the expense of the egalitarian ideals that make Canadians proud. Delineating the boundary between intelligence-led, effective law enforcement and racial profiling is a matter of considerable debate. The recent work of Satzewich and Shaffir (2009) provides some needed insight into the racial-profiling phenomenon, helping us to explore the distinction between intelligence-led policing and racial profiling. Their work helps us to think about the issues that need to be resolved in legal disputes arising from racially charged encounters between the police and the public. However, it should not be seen as an authority police can appeal to in asserting that their denials of racial profiling have as much validity as do the claims of those who provide evidence of the prevalence of racial profiling and other discriminatory practices in our criminal justice system. The law governing racial profiling has grown considerably over the last ten years. That growth has resulted in numerous significant developments in various areas of the law, all of which touch on the need for ongoing vigilance regarding police practices and law-enforcement policy. Most allegations of racial profiling arise out of circumstances in which the decision of police to target someone for investigation is called into question. This often occurs in circumstances with low visibility, where the police have a high level of discretion and are free from having to account for the decisions they make. For example, it arises where the police decide to stop someone who is driving a motor vehicle. Police have widespread discretion under provincial motor vehicle laws to stop motorists and inquire into their fitness to drive and the roadworthiness of their vehicle. Most provinces have motor vehicle legislation authorizing the police to stop any vehicle operating on the highway. (1) These powers generally entitle the police randomly to stop any vehicle, at any time, even where the driver does not appear to have done anything wrong. (2) Similarly, the police have widespread discretion to confront individuals on the street and ask them questions. There is no legal standard requiring the police only to speak to certain people in specific circumstances. Another area of wide discretion is in the conduct of customs officers. They have unfettered discretion to stop individuals entering the country and ask them questions in order to ascertain their status as residents or citizens and to ascertain whether they are bringing contraband into the country. Canada Customs officers are empowered by section 11(1) of the Customs Act (1985) to ask any questions of those entering the country, so long as the questions pertain to their duties under that act. They may also examine any goods being brought into the country in accordance with section 99 of the act. While these initial encounters tend to be free from the application of any precise legal standard, more in-depth police-citizen encounters typically require the police to comply with a pre-set standard that limits their intrusion into private lives to circumstances that the courts and legislatures have determined justify such intrusion. Accordingly, the decision of the police to conduct a sobriety test of a driver or to search the vehicle being driven by a motorist requires that they have sufficient grounds to justify these intrusions. …

Racial profiling is a discriminatory practice of singling out individuals by police officers based on their race. During COVID-19, Chinese people suffer tsunamis of racial profiling, referring to them as virus holders, which makes them confront substantial challenges facing bias and oppression in different places. Despite the number of studies that tackled racial profiling within the law enforcement field through different perspectives, none of them has tried to approach the topic outside the police field during the pandemic period using Critical Race Theory. Thus, the current study aims to investigate the acts of racial profiling appointed against the Wei-Evans in Kelly Yangs’ New from Here (2022) in light of Delgado and Stefancic’s Critical Race Theory (2017). Following a descriptive qualitative analysis, the study adopts the theory’s concepts of ‘Racism is Common not Aberrational’, ‘intersectionality’, ‘Race is socially Constructed’ and ‘The Unique Voice of Colour’ as methodological tools to analyse the novel. Scenes, where the protagonists encounter degrading, dehumanisation and racism, are examined to figure out how Covid-19 helps in profiling the Chinese characters and how they react to such profiling. The study concludes that racial profiling is a discriminatory practice perpetrated by different individuals against Chinese people during COVID-19 time to perpetuate Western dominance over non-Westerners. Moreover, the study concludes that the Wei-Evans challenge racial profiling by creating counter-narratives, empowered by their ‘Unique Voice of Colour’ to de-profile and voice themselves. Finally, the study circulates the term ‘Racial Profiling’ outside the police institution because it is only used within police areas.

Racial profiling has become a prominent issue in modern policing today. Instead of being based on individual suspicion, racial profiling embodies a belief that people of color are continuously singled out by the police for scrutiny and harassment. Policies and procedures make the Black community vulnerable to police discrimination and racial profiling. Floyd et al. v. City of New York et al. (2013) declared that the New York Police Department’s (NYPD) practice of stop-and-frisk was racially profiling Black civilians. This study sought (1) to determine if the NYPD post-Floyd is still engaging in racial profiling towards Black civilians; and (2) to evaluate the relationship between race and the number of stops, frisks, and arrests with the T-test. Based on the data released by the NYPD from 2011 to 2015 and 2019 (N=1,492,295), results indicated that the NYPD is engaging in racial profiling towards Black civilians post-Floyd and that there is a relationship between race and the number of stops, frisks, and arrests between Black and White civilians. The results contribute to a wider research consensus that racial profiling and discrimination are a presence in police practices in the United States.

According to Mathias Risse and Richard Zeckhauser, racial profiling can be justified in society, such as the contemporary United States, where the legacy of slavery and segregation found in lesser but, nonetheless, troubling forms of racial (1) Racial profiling, Risse and Zeckhauser recognize, often marked by police abuse and the harassment of racial minorities and by the disproportionate use of race in profiling. These, on their view, are unjustified. But, they contend, this does not mean that all forms of racial profiling are unjustified; nor, they claim, need one be indifferent to the harms of racism in order to justify racial profiling. In fact, one of the aims of their paper to show that racial profiling, suitably understood, is consistent with support for far-reaching measures to decrease racial inequities and inequality. (2) Hence, one of their most striking claims, in an original and provocative paper, that one can endorse racial profiling without being in way indifferent to the disadvantaged status of racial minorities. In an initial response to these claims, I argued that Risse and Zeckhauser tend to underestimate the harms of racial profiling. (3) I suggested two main reasons why they did so. The first that they tend to identify the more serious harms associated with profiling with background racism, and therefore to believe that these are not properly attributable to profiling itself. The second reason that they ignore the ways in which background racism makes even relatively minor harms harder to bear and to justify than would otherwise be the case. Hence, I concluded, racial profiling cannot be normal part of police practice in society still struggling with racism, although under very special conditions and with special regulation and compensation in place, it might be justified as an extraordinary police measure. I want to stand by those claims. However, Risse's response to my arguments persuades me that I misinterpreted his earlier position in one significant respect.4 So I will start by explaining what interpretive mistake I believe that I made. I will then argue that despite Risse's patient and careful response to my arguments, my initial concerns with his justification of profiling remain valid. Some Terminology Before getting under way, however, it might be helpful to recapitulate some terminology. The first about racial profiling. I am happy to accept Risse and Zeckhauser's definition of it as any police-initiated action that relies on the race, ethnicity, or national origin and not merely on the behavior of an individual. (5) As they say, there are several different forms of profiling, so described. The two main ones are what I will call post-crime profiling and prospective or preventive profiling. It the latter that the most controversial, and that the focus of both our papers. Whereas post-crime profiling departs from witness's description, however vague, of suspect who has actually committed crime, preventive profiling creates profile based on statistical evidence of who likely to commit crime, and then uses this to initiate police stops and searches. Its aims, therefore, are to prevent crime--if possible by catching criminals before they are actually able to carry out their nefarious plans. This form of profiling controversial because we generally suppose that the police are entitled to stop and search only people whose behavior supports the belief that they have committed, or are about to commit, crime. The preemptive aspects of profiling seem to threaten that principle, and thus to justify what, in American constitutional jargon, would be called a warrantless search. (6) In addition to these general worries about prospective profiling, however, there are worries specific to racial profiling. Those worries, quite simply, are that profiling based on racial characteristics (as popularly understood), (7) exacerbates racism in society, and likely to lead to the abuse and harassment of racial minorities. …

Post-9/11, law-enforcement agencies have expanded the processing of personal data for terrorist profiles; this is actually among the very reasons why personal data are processed in the first place. De facto terrorist profiles tend to be based predominantly on the use of such criteria as ‘race’, colour, religion, or ethnic and national origin to single out persons for enhanced scrutiny. Terrorist-profiling practices, therefore, raise the question as to their conformity with the right to privacy, the protection of personal data, and the principle of non-discrimination. This article critically examines to what extent, if any, terrorist-profiling practices may be regarded as compatible with the principle of non-discrimination and the fundamental rules pertaining to the protection of personal data. For this purpose, it looks at various approaches to defining profiling in the context of countering terrorism, as well as describing de facto manifestations of terrorist-profiling practices. The conclusion is that terrorist-profiling practices all too often fail to comply with the fundamental requirement that any restrictions on the right to privacy and the protection of personal data are adequately regulated, necessary and proportionate. The so-called ethnic profiling gives rise to particularly serious problems. It tends to assume the nature of ‘racial’ profiling and, accordingly, entail discriminatory effects that can result in feelings of humiliation and stigmatisation among the targeted groups. Since the risk of further marginalisation and even radicalisation within those groups also appears to be a very real consideration, the whole necessity of ethnic profiling in the name of countering terrorism must be called into question in a contemporary democratic society built on the principles of pluralism and respect for different cultures.

Urban trees are of high importance for healthy urban ecosystems. However, some trees are invasive plants that may ‘escape’ from urban areas into natural environments. Furthermore, invasive forest pests often arrive and establish in urban environments before they spread to forest ecosystems. Therefore, knowledge of tree species composition in urban areas is important for the biosecurity of cities and surrounding forests. Despite this, urban tree inventories often lack information on trees on private properties. To assess the potential role of urban areas as a source of invasive trees as well as invasive pests of trees, we compared the species composition of urban trees in public and private spaces in several Swiss cities and in tree nurseries (henceforth: ‘nurseries’) in Switzerland. We analysed the various data sets we compiled regarding invasive tree species, and examined how many trees are potential hosts for invasive quarantine pests of trees. We found no statistically significant difference in tree species composition in public and private urban areas, but the proportion of non-native trees was higher in private than in public spaces. Tree species available in nurseries and those present in cities were not significantly different, with larger urban tree inventories having a greater overlap with the species available in nurseries. Five of eight tree species considered invasive whose sale was banned since September 2024 were still on sale ten months before the ban came into force. All eight tree species were present in urban tree inventories. Importantly, between 91 % and 97 % of all urban trees in public and private spaces were suitable hosts for at least one quarantine forest pest. Given the pivotal role that urban trees play for the health of urban and peri-urban ecosystems, knowledge of tree species composition is essential from a biosecurity perspective. Our findings suggest that the combination of public urban tree inventories and trees available from nurseries can provide an estimate of the composition of private urban trees and can be useful for invasive species monitoring.

Racial is practice of subjecting citizens to increased surveillance or scrutiny based on racial or ethic factors rather than reasonable suspicion. The current debate (Satzewich and Shaffir 2009; Henry and Tator 2011) focuses on whether intention matters in considering racial-profiling practices. Satzewich and Shaffir (2009) argue that intentions of policing agents are an important consideration for understanding racial profiling. In their rejoinder, Henry and Tator (2011) invoke principle that racism/racial is to be judged primarily by its consequences in creating inequality for certain (66); they cite case law that recognizes that motivation or intention of perpetrator is irrelevant to judgement that racial discrimination has occurred. It is clear that, given power and discretion available to police, experience of being subject to racial can lead both to a feeling of being harassed and to a sense of alienation from legal system and wider society (Glover 2008). For victims of racial profiling, intention of policing agent is not an issue; sense of injustice and insecurity is stays with them. Over a long period of time, negative experience such as racial can lead to specific ethnic groups' losing confidence in police (cf., Bradford, Jackson, and Stanko 2009). Nevertheless, there is merit in Satzewich and Shaffir's (2009) argument that, in order to find a solution to problem of racial profiling, it is important to determine whether such discriminatory practices are result of officers' being racially prejudiced or whether they are unintended result of certain organizational practices. In practice, racial is difficult to prove. Empirical studies to distinguish between improper and proper use of race by police have yielded mixed results (see, e.g., Alpert, Dunham, and Smith 2007; Antonovics and Knight 2009). Alpert et al. (2007) describe three mechanisms through which racial disparities in police treatment can happen: through prejudice, through cognitive bias and stereotyping, and through race-based deployment. While prejudice involves conscious intent, cognitive bias and stereotyping can be unconscious biases based on false assumptions about criminality of ethic groups, while race-based deployment is an organizational or local practice that may or may not involve individual intent and consciousness. Satzewich and Shaffir (2009: 200-201) suggest that racial is best understood in context of a police subculture where police regard as part of their work; it occurs even in absence of officers who may be inclined to prejudice or discrimination against members of visible minorities (201). The authors have demonstrated through interviews with police officers that what critics label as racially practices, police view as sound, work-related criminal profiling (201). There is certainly a vast literature that supports finding that street-level police officers often form stereotypical opinions abut criminality of certain ethnic groups and use such visual cues in routine, proactive policing work (see, e.g., Ericson 1982; Bayley and Mendelsohn 1969). These ways of seeing and acting are regarded as features of police (sub)culture that appear to be common across space and time. Satzewich and Shaffir (2009) provide evidence that police officers in their study (even officers from ethnic minorities) saw as integral to police work and admitted that racial appearance of citizen was one factor among others that they took into account when deciding whether to intervene. The authors suggest that the occupational culture enables police to draw upon a vocabulary of explanations that permit[s] them to deny responsibility when faced with allegation that their is racially motivated (Satzewich and Shaffir 2009: 211). …

This article analyses the moral status of racial profiling from a consequentialist perspective and argues that, contrary to what proponents of racial profiling might assume, there is a prima facie case against racial profiling on consequentialist grounds. To do so it establishes general definitions of police practices and profiling, sketches out the costs and benefits involved in racial profiling in particular and presents three challenges. The foundation challenge suggests that the shifting of burdens onto marginalized minorities may, even when profiling itself is justified, serve to prolong unjustified police practices. The valuation challenge argues that although both costs and benefits are difficult to establish, the benefits of racial profiling are afflicted with greater uncertainty than the costs, and must be comparatively discounted. Finally, the application challenge argues that using racial profiling in practice will be complicated by both cognitive and psychological biases, which together reduce the effectiveness of profiling while still incurring its costs. Jointly, it is concluded, these challenges establish a prima facie case against racial profiling, so that the real challenge consists in helping officers practice the art of the police and not see that which it is useless that they should see.

Racial profiling is a unique regime of social control specifically due to its reinvention of blackness as a signifier to criminality. The author argues that the ‘new black’ (or new non‐white) is reconstructed under this regime when previous regimes did not necessarily criminalize whole groups. This study employs panopticism, and its critique by Foucault, to argue that racial profiling as dressage aims to increase the visibility of black people – control minorities. Its different practices (like Driving While Black) aim to normalize, assimilate, and rehabilitate everyone to one centre. It is done by means of penetrating the consciousness through continuous surveillance, thereby making the black individual an obedient citizen. The article argues also that the expression of social control in the racial profiling regime is spatial too. This means that space is classified so that some activities are criminal only if they occur in the ghetto, or at the borders of white neighbourhoods. Racial profiling serves as a reminder of the black people's ‘place’. Thus, it is all about the perpetual visibility of the modern individual. The author argues that racial profiling is designed to enhance this visibility. Racial profiling is not the first regime to occur; it succeeded three preceding social control regimes: slavery, Jim Crow, and mass imprisonment. All these regimes are a manifestation of a fundamental structural fault of modern society: racism and inequality. That is the modern state surveillance function. So, the question addressed here is: how does surveillance through police practices shape the modern subject (how is the subject socially produced)?

‘The “exceptional” nature of the French cultural and political tradition’, as scholar Catherine Raissiguier sees it ‘resides … in its ability to foreground a strong discourse of universal inclusion and equality along with its unique resistance to acknowledging exclusionary and discriminatory discourses and practices both in its past and in its present’ (2010: 1). In keeping with Raissiguier’s conceptualisation, les contrôles au faciès (which translates as ‘racial profiling’) fit squarely within this model at this moment when politicised discourse racialises diversity and defines it as a threat to personal and national security. The French Republican model functions in this context as an authoritarian mode of assimilation and universalism that seeks to destroy difference at the expense of equality and inclusion. These ‘controls’ are only, however, the surface of a deeper and more insidious problem in French society that continues to go misnamed and thus mishandled: race.

Reverse Deterrence in Racial Profiling: Increased Transgressions by the Non-Profiled Group

An increasing body of literature emphasizes the role of refugees' social context, with social conditions both at home and in the host society having an impact on the possibility of power redistribution and the mobilization of agency in collaborative research practices. Our aim is to develop a contextualized understanding of research participation for refugees in collaborative research in order to further enhance insights on the potential strengths and pitfalls of collaborative refugee research. We closely study the various relational contexts that shape refugees' research participation and that may have an influence on power dynamics in collaborative research. In the present study, we explore participants' adaptation of research participation by means of an interpretive cross-case analysis of three psychosocial intervention studies sharing a collaborative approach with refugee participants, refugee families, refugee communities, and professional partners at different stages in the research process. We identify the developed collaborative strategies in our three case studies and provide an outline of the ways refugees mobilize research participation through these identified collaborative strategies, from within the relational contexts of the family, community, and institutional actors. This analysis shows how research participation operates as a relational forum in which refugees continuously navigate and negotiate within and between multiple relational contexts. We argue that performing research participation, as a way of relating to a relational context, is both an interactive and a dynamic process. For research practice, our analysis addresses the importance of an in-depth understanding of participants' relational contexts to foster both a reflective research practice and trustful research relationships between researchers and participants. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

This chapter addresses a particular remedy for a specific type of Thirteenth Amendment violation: namely, the exclusion from criminal trial of evidence obtained by racial profiling. As a matter of constitutional interpretation and historical context, racial profiling should be treated as a badge or incident of slavery prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment. The victims of racial profiling should both be able to sue violators and to prevent evidence obtained by racial profiling from being used against them in criminal proceedings. The exclusionary rule bars the use of evidence in a criminal trial where that evidence was unconstitutionally obtained. Whatever the abstract merits of current arguments surrounding the efficacy or wisdom of the exclusionary rule generally or in other contexts, the Thirteenth Amendment does not countenance the government's obtaining criminal convictions based upon evidence gathered by police practices that amount to a badge or incident of slavery. While the exclusion of evidence that is relevant to the defendant's guilt potentially carries social costs, those costs are justified in cases of racial profiling because the practice is abhorrent to the Thirteenth Amendment and the rule of law.