Abstract
This study investigates how proxy solicitation and director ownership jointly affect directors' career consequences in Taiwan. We report that assent votes partly arising from proxies without shareholder voice increase the likelihood of departure for directors with higher ownership in firms soliciting proxies, especially for busy directors. Since proxy votes do not build extra reputation, this generates no spillover effect for both non-busy and busy directors. Overall, we support the arguments based on prior studies that votes holding information on shareholder voice have implications on directors’ careers. Furthermore, different board seats provide unequal incentives for busy directors.
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