Effects of multiple incentives on electric vehicle charging infrastructure deployment in China: An evolutionary analysis in complex network

Abstract

With the current booming electric vehicle industry, an insufficient supply of electric vehicle charging infrastructure (EVCI) has become a major barrier to further penetration of electric vehicles. Chinese provincial and municipal governments have introduced multiple incentives to address EVCI investment obstacles and promote EVCI deployment. However, the effectiveness and differential effects of these policies are unclear. In this context, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model in complex networks for EVCI deployment that captures the dynamic interactions as well as internal and external influences in infrastructure networks. Leveraging this model, this paper simulates the effects of multiple incentive policies, including investment subsidies, construction subsidies, operation subsidies, user charging subsidies, and policy mixes on EVCI deployment. The results reveal that investment subsidies are quite effective but have more pronounced marginal diminishing effects. Both construction and operation subsidies have had a steady and positive impact. Implementing the two incentives as a policy mix can exert complementary effects, but a careful cost-benefit analysis is needed to prevent incentive saturation. The effect of charging subsidies is not as significant as other incentives. Finally, incentive policies should be implemented for a long time and adjusted for different markets and stages to optimize effectiveness.