Abstract
This study investigates the determinants of the cross-border-related party (CBRP) transactions of Chinese firms. Our empirical analysis of companies listed on China's stock exchanges provides insightful findings. First, the size of CBRP transactions is positively associated with concentrated ownership, CEO (chief executive officer) duality, and an imbalance of power among large shareholders. Furthermore, the size of CBRP transactions tends to decrease as the proportion of outside directors rises, but it is likely to increase as the outside directors' compensations become larger. State-owned companies make more CBRP transactions than non-state-owned companies. Finally, the equity incentive for executives produces insignificant effects on CBRP transactions.
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