Effects of Emotional and Sensorimotor Knowledge in Semantic Processing of Concrete and Abstract Nouns

P Ian Newcombe,Cale Campbell,Penny M Pexman,Paul D Siakaluk

doi:10.3389/fnhum.2012.00275

Abstract

There is much empirical evidence that words’ relative imageability and body-object interaction (BOI) facilitate lexical processing for concrete nouns (e.g., Bennett et al., 2011). These findings are consistent with a grounded cognition framework (e.g., Barsalou, 2008), in which sensorimotor knowledge is integral to lexical processing. In the present study, we examined whether lexical processing is also sensitive to the dimension of emotional experience (i.e., the ease with which words evoke emotional experience), which is also derived from a grounded cognition framework. We examined the effects of emotional experience, imageability, and BOI in semantic categorization for concrete and abstract nouns. Our results indicate that for concrete nouns, emotional experience was associated with less accurate categorization, whereas imageability and BOI were associated with faster and more accurate categorization. For abstract nouns, emotional experience was associated with faster and more accurate categorization, whereas BOI was associated with slower and less accurate categorization. This pattern of results was observed even with many other lexical and semantic dimensions statistically controlled. These findings are consistent with Vigliocco et al.’s (2009) theory of semantic representation, which states that emotional knowledge underlies meanings for abstract concepts, whereas sensorimotor knowledge underlies meanings for concrete concepts.

Highlights

Classical theories of cognition hold that perception and cognition have distinct representational formats, such that perceptual representations are modal, whereas conceptual representations are amodal (Fodor, 1983; Pylyshyn, 1984)
According to perceptual symbol systems (PSS), conceptual knowledge is largely acquired through bodily interaction with the environment and is inherently multimodal, such that different aspects of conceptual knowledge are stored in different neural systems dedicated to sensorimotor processing
According to the PSS framework of grounded cognition, conceptual processing involves simulation, or the partial reenactment of the neural states involved during bodily interaction with the environment (Barsalou, 1999)

Summary

Introduction

Classical theories of cognition hold that perception and cognition have distinct representational formats, such that perceptual representations are modal, whereas conceptual representations are amodal (Fodor, 1983; Pylyshyn, 1984). A growing number of cognitive scientists have proposed an alternative theoretical perspective, called embodied or grounded cognition, in which modal representations underlie both perceptual and conceptual knowledge (e.g., Pecher and Zwaan, 2005). Conceptual processing occurs via simulation, or the partial reenactment of the various neural states that were involved during bodily interaction with the environment. Barsalou (2003, 2008, 2009) has emphasized that an important aspect of the acquisition and subsequent simulation of conceptual knowledge is that it does not occur in a contextual vacuum. That is, “(a)t any given moment in perception, people perceive the immediate space around them, including agents, objects, and events present” (Barsalou, 2009, p. 1283)

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