Abstract
Previous research provided consistent evidence for the existence of the unique cognitive limitation in depressed mood: the impairment of the construction of mental models. In the current research, we applied the classical paradigm using categorical syllogisms to examine the relationship between depressed mood and integrative reasoning, aiming at gathering research evidence on the moderating role of the operation span of working memory. Specifically, we examine the hypothesis that high working memory capacity is a buffering variable and acts as a protective factor preventing the negative impact of depressed mood on syllogistic reasoning. A categorical syllogism, in the simpler evaluative form, consists of two premises (that are assumed to be true) and a conclusion that is to be evaluated as valid (when it follows logically from the premises) or invalid (when it does not follow from the premises). In the cover story, we informed participants that they would read about some observations carried out in a normal garden (believable conclusions) versus in a garden with radical genetic transformations (unbelievable conclusions) in order to stimulate the emergence of belief bias. The participants were 115 high school students who filled out the BDI scale and completed the OSPAN task. In line with predictions, there were main effects of depressed mood and operation span on the accuracy of performance (worse performance in the group with a high in comparison to a low level of depressed mood and much worse performance in low compared to high OSPAN participants). The analyses yielded a strong interaction effect of Depressed mood × OSPAN × Conflict. For participants with high levels of working memory capacity, there were no limitations related to a high level of depressed mood in syllogistic reasoning. On the other hand, a different pattern emerged for participants with low working memory span. In this group, participants with a high level of depressed mood in comparison to those with a low level of depressed mood showed much higher limitations in syllogistic reasoning, especially in reasoning concerning conflict syllogisms. We discuss the implications of this research for recent therapeutic programs using computerized cognitive tasks aimed at individuals with a high level of depressed mood.
Highlights
Numerous recent research has indicated multiple ways in which emotions affect the quality of higher order cognitive processes such as reasoning
Gathered research findings provide further compelling evidence for the cognitive exhaustion model of subclinical depression that depressed mood substantially impairs generative mental models activity; in the current study related to building correct mental models of syllogistic reasoning
There was the significant main effect of the level of depressed mood on limitations in syllogistic reasoning, in line with predictions, this relationship was strongly moderated by individual differences in working memory capacity and by the construction of syllogisms
Summary
Numerous recent research has indicated multiple ways in which emotions affect the quality of higher order cognitive processes such as reasoning (for reviews, see Blanchette and Richards, 2010; Blanchette, 2014). Depression is characterized by persistent negative mood and specific deficits in cognitive functioning (Joormann and Arditte, 2014; Rock et al, 2014; Trivedi and Greer, 2014). These deficits include “ruminative” thinking, recurring ideas and thoughts with negative or self-devaluing content. Such deficits involve individuals with depression experiencing limitations in solving complex cognitive problems. There are a number of explanations for an impaired performance of complex tasks in depressed individuals; drawing on cognitive resources or memory limitations (Hasher and Zacks, 1979; Weingartner, 1986; Burt et al, 1995; Gotlib et al, 1996), impaired inhibition (Hertel, 2004; Joormann, 2005), lowered efficiency of cognitive strategies (Hartlage et al, 1993; Smith et al, 1993; Kofta and Sedek, 1998; von Hecker and Sedek, 1999), or lack of cognitive initiative (Hertel and Hardin, 1990; Hertel, 1997) as explanatory concepts
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