Abstract
Corruption is one of the major challenges to the effectiveness of REDD programs and should be addressed. In this paper we use a dynamic game model to analyze the effects of corruption on the performance of REDD programs, and on the benefits to stakeholders. Using panel data from 2010 to 2013 of 11 partner countries of the UN-REDD Programme countries, relationships between corruption and performance in REDD programs are empirical analyzed. Empirical results confirm that an increase in the degree of corruption may lessen emissions reduction, leading to a decrease in an investment in the REDD program. Following from this analysis, this paper proposes to: (i) establish a credible, transparent, and efficient governance structure, (ii) develop a fair and transparent benefit-sharing mechanism, as well as (iii) use a market mechanism in REDD programs to avoid corruption.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
