Effects of Competition Intensities and R&D Spillovers on a Cournot Duopoly Game of Digital Economies

Abstract

In this paper, we introduce a Cournot duopoly game that can characterize fierce competition in digital economies and employ it to examine the effects of research and development (R&D) spillovers while considering various competition intensities. We obtain the analytical solution of the Nash equilibrium and the expression of commodity price, firm production, and variable profit under some key competition intensities. Furthermore, we analyze the local stability of the Nash equilibrium and derive that the equilibrium may lose its stability only through a 1:4 resonance bifurcation. Numerical simulations are conducted, through which we find that the Nash equilibrium transitions to complex dynamics through a cascade of period-doubling bifurcations. Phase portraits are also provided to illustrate more details of the dynamics, which confirm the previous theoretical finding that the Nash equilibrium loses its stability through a 1:4 resonance bifurcation.