Effects of Board Characteristics on Accruals Earnings Management in the Wake of Financial Crisis

Abstract

This paper investigates the association between corporate governance and earnings management. More specifically, the effects of board characteristics on earnings management are examined. A proxy of earnings management, namely discretionary accruals (Modified Jones Model, 1995) is used to measure the level of earnings management. A sample of 103 firms listed on the Athens Stock Exchange during the period 2015-2019 was employed. Using panel data regressions, the authors explore the relationship between the discretionary accruals and five board characteristics as identified in the literature (independence, family directors, female directors, foreign directors, and CEO duality). The main findings of the study suggested that earnings management is restricted in firms with more independent directors and firms in which the same person takes the role of the CEO and the chairman of the board. Empirical results also indicate that in high performing firms earnings management is reduced while in firms with high levels of debt the opposite appears to be the case. The findings of the study have implications for many stakeholders such as regulators, managers, shareholders, etc. This paper contributes to the academic debate on earnings management by complementing the work of other researchers on the impact of corporate governance on earnings management in the wake of a financial crisis.