Abstract
Cooperative behaviour among people facing social dilemmas remains an unsolved puzzle. Sanction systems such as punishment and reward are well-known solutions to social dilemmas. On the one hand, it is theorised that peer sanctions cannot maintain cooperation because of the intrusion of second-order free riders. On the other hand, experimental studies have widely reported that cooperation is sustainable by first-order sanction systems. To understand the divergence between theory and experimental results, we focus on the effects of beliefs about sanctions on promoting cooperation. While previous studies have revealed effects of beliefs about other people’s cooperation in public goods games (PGGs), the effect of beliefs about sanctions have not been considered. We conducted a scenario-based experiment using one-shot PGGs with and without sanction systems. The results revealed that beliefs about sanctions promote cooperation in a PGG when types of sanctions and some psychological attitudes to cooperation are controlled for. Our results indicate that the beliefs of actors promote cooperation despite the possible presence of second-order free riders. A belief about sanctions differs from a preference for cooperative behaviour and the amount a player pays to exercise a sanction. It is necessary to consider players’ beliefs about a sanction when studying its effectiveness.
Highlights
Altruistic behaviour, such as helping others and contributing to a public good, is observed in society despite a competitive environment
In the analysis of Experiment 1, to confirm that there was no difference in the original cooperation rate between the punishment and reward condition groups, the cooperation rate in the N-public goods games (PGGs) was analysed
No significant difference was observed in the N-PGG in the order of NPR or NRP (13.0% NPR, 18.0% NRP, F (1, 94) = .439, p = .509, η2 = .005)
Summary
Altruistic behaviour, such as helping others and contributing to a public good, is observed in society despite a competitive environment. Many ways to promote cooperative behaviour in relation to social dilemmas have been discussed. Many theoretical and experimental studies have investigated the evolution of cooperation (Nowak and Sigmund, 2005; Sigmund, 2011). Studies have examined the promotion of cooperation by imposing regulations or playing games. Third parties can conduct surveillance and signal when they observe certain behaviours or sanctions (Fehr et al, 2002; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Sutter et al, 2010; Milinski and Rockenbach, 2011), and such sanctions can be meted out to participants in society depending on whether they cooperate (Bateson et al, 2006)
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