Abstract
The fuzzy commitment scheme (FCS) is one of the most effective biometric cryptosystems (BCs) that provide secure management of cryptographic keys using biometric templates. In this scheme, error correcting codes (ECCs) are firstly employed to encode a cryptographic key into a codeword which is then secured via linking (committing) it with a biometric template of the same length. Unfortunately, the key length is constrained by the size of the adopted biometric template as well as the employed ECC(s). In this paper, we propose a secure iris template protection scheme that combines cancelable biometrics with the FCS in order to secure long cryptographic keys without sacrificing the recognition accuracy. First, we utilize cancelable biometrics to derive revocable templates of large sizes from the most reliable bits in iris codes. Then, the FCS is applied to the obtained cancelable iris templates to secure cryptographic keys of the desired length. The revocability of cryptographic keys as well as true iris templates is guaranteed due to the hybridization of both techniques. Experimental results show that the proposed hybrid system can achieve high recognition accuracy regardless of the key size.
Highlights
In the last few years, the marriage between biometrics and cryptography has been proven to be an effective approach to address several issues inherent to both technologies [1]
biometric cryptosystems (BCs), such as fuzzy extractors [8], the fuzzy vault scheme (FVS) [9] and the fuzzy commitment scheme (FCS) [10], bind/extract user-specific keys to/from biometric templates such that the key is released only if a genuine biometric sample is presented at the time of verification
We propose a novel hybrid template protection system that combines both CB and BCs effectively to protect iris templates as well as cryptographic keys at the same time
Summary
BCs, such as fuzzy extractors [8], the fuzzy vault scheme (FVS) [9] and the fuzzy commitment scheme (FCS) [10], bind/extract user-specific keys to/from biometric templates such that the key is released only if a genuine biometric sample is presented at the time of verification This construct can be employed to protect biometric templates as well as to provide a practical approach to manage cryptographic keys. Thanks to the proposed BioEncoding-based cancelable transformation method, the suggested hybrid system exhibits the following advantages over other existing hybrid template protection techniques: (1) no user-specific data need to be used with the proposed hybrid system (i.e., the proposed system is tokenless), (2) no restrictions are imposed on the size of the key to be secured using the proposed system, (3) both keys and iris templates could be revoked and replaced in case of compromise, and (4) a perfect recognition accuracy (0% ERR) can be achieved regardless of the key size.
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