Effect of Unilateral Third-Party Interventions on Durability of Civil Peace Agreements: Facilitators or Spoilers of Post-Settlement Peace?

Abstract

Third-party interventions play a fundamental role in every stage of the civil conflict process and vast amount of research has been devoted to how interventions affect these various stages. Some studies perceive third-party interveners as custodians of post-settlement civil peace (Walter 2002). Yet, we also have ample evidence that unilateral third-party interveners’ seek to shape war outcomes in their own interests, with negative consequences for peace (Regan 2002). Which of these perspectives correctly capture the potential effect of biased third-party intervention on post-settlement peace? Third-parties are motivated by self-interest when they intervene in civil conflict. Therefore, I argue that, rather than asking whether biased third-party interveners get involved to guarantee or tear down post-settlement peace; the question we should be asking is, when is it in interveners’ interest to nurture and implement the peace agreement and when is it in their interest to spoil it? Depending on how satisfied the third-party intervener and the signatory are with the policy outcomes of settlement, the intervention leads to facilitation or blocking of settlement implementation. Using a survey of indicators including geographical, historical, and ideological proximity of interveners to the side they support as well as number of interveners, I examine the durability of every peace agreement signed between years 1980 and 2008. Empirical findings using Cox proportional hazards model point at the complex and varying influence of interventions on the durability of peace agreements.