Effect of heterogeneous investment induced by payoff and emotion on cooperation in public goods games by considering memory decline effects.

Abstract

Payoff, emotion, and historical memory directly determine investment decision-making for incomplete rational men in a public goods game (PGG). How these factors affect investment and cooperation behavior has not been investigated yet. Thus, we proposed a new investment model involving theses three factors to examine its coupling effect on cooperation in PGG. An emotional increment was employed to describe the emotional change in every round by supposing an investor' pleasure to a cooperator but regret to a defector. Furthermore, an emotional index was formed by accumulating these historical changes with a memory decline effect. Then an investment formula was proposed by considering this emotional index and a historical payoff. Moreover, the cooperation level affected by these factors was investigated. Results show a mutually reinforcing relationship between emotional and payoff investments. A poor memory capacity coefficient allows defectors to change their behaviors but produces some opportunists. A large memory length results in a high cooperator fraction but is not suggested to be too large.