Effect of Guided Delegation and Information Proximity on Multitier Responsible Sourcing

Abstract

Problem definition: Guided delegation, a practice in which companies provide guidelines when delegating supplier management to tier 1 firms, is a common practice in managing complex supply chains. We study the benefits and risks of this approach in a three-tier supply chain setting consisting of a buying firm, a tier 1 contract manufacturer, and tier 2 suppliers, where responsibility risk stems from the tier 2 suppliers. We analyze the buyer’s profit and the supply chain’s responsibility risk under a guided-delegation model, in which the buyer specifies an authorized tier 2 supplier for the tier 1 manufacturer as a guideline and may audit the tier 1 firm for compliance. We compare this model with a full-delegation model, in which the buyer fully delegates tier 2 supplier selection to the tier 1 firm. Methodology/results: We formulate a Stackelberg game for the buyer’s contract design problem. We show that guided delegation does not always yield its expected results of lower supply chain risk and greater buyer profit. In instances where compliance auditing is financially more attractive to the buyer than paying a premium for tier 1’s responsible sourcing, guided delegation can result in higher profit but increased risk because compliance auditing cannot completely eliminate the risk. Additionally, when tier 1 anticipates buyer audits and demands higher wholesale prices to offset potential penalties, guided delegation may lead to decreased risk but lower profit for the buyer. Our analysis shows that delegating audit responsibilities to tier 1 often does not improve the buyer’s profit, and in situations where it does, it invariably raises the supply chain risk. Managerial implications: Our research identifies the potential downsides of guided delegation, offering insight for external stakeholders on where to focus efforts to avoid these pitfalls. It suggests that the intended benefits of guided delegation can only be realized when paired with compliance auditing. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2020.0446 .