Effect of explicit deposit insurance premium on the moral hazard of banks’ risk-taking: Around the globe

Abstract

The adoption of explicit deposit insurance increases the moral hazard of banks’ risk-taking, caused by the decrease in depositors’ discipline. Based on the contract theory, this study probes whether the inception of risk-based deposit insurance premium may limit the moral hazard of banks’ risk-taking triggered by the deposit insurance. This study conducted the analysis on 2,196 banks of 125 countries, covered by the Bankscope database from 2002 to 2014 period. The hierarchical linear models (HLM) were used for empirical estimation of research models. The findings revealed that risk-based deposit insurance premium deteriorated the moral hazard of banks’ risk-taking, incited by the enactment of explicit deposit insurance, while this effect was high for the small banks. Therefore, the small banks were more stable and positively affected by the selection of risk-based deposit insurance premium as compared to the larger counterparts. However, it cannot eliminate this negative effect completely. Hence, the implementation of the premium structure by policymakers on the finding of this study encouraged the depositors and investors’ confidence in the banking system around the globe.