Effect of Disinformation Propagation on Opinion Dynamics: A Game Theoretic Approach

Abstract

Disinformation can alter or manipulate our values, opinions, and rational decisions toward any life event because disinformation, such as fake news or rumors, is propagated rapidly and broadly in online social networks (OSNs). Game-theoretic models can help people maximize the benefits from dynamic social interactions. This work presents an opinion framework formulated by repeated, incomplete information games that model OSN users’ subjective opinions. The users may update their opinions using various criteria, such as uncertainty, homophily, encounter, herding, or assertion. We demonstrate how Subjective Logic, a belief model explicitly handling opinion uncertainty, can be employed to model attackers’ deception strategies, users’ opinion update models, and the influences of propagating disinformation through the interactions between users. Through extensive experiments, we investigated how an individual user's information processing type can introduce different impacts on the extent of disinformation propagation. We compared the performance of the five different opinion update models under OSNs characterized by two real OSN datasets. We analyzed their impact on the choices of best strategies, their utilities, and network/opinion polarization. We also examined how the player's choices of best strategies under uncertainty are different from Nash Equilibrium strategies based on correct beliefs towards their opponents’ moves.