Effect of Appointed Directors on Corporate Carbon Emission Intensity: Evidence from Mixed-Ownership Reform in Chinese Private Industrial Enterprises

Abstract

The growing prominence of global warming has led to a worldwide consensus on the need to reduce carbon emissions. Employing a sample of private industrial enterprises listed on the Chinese stock market from 2008 to 2021, this study explores the effect of directors appointed by non-controlling state shareholders (appointed directors), which is a growing type of mixed-ownership reform, on corporate carbon emission intensity. The results show that appointed directors significantly reduce corporate carbon emission intensity. Mechanism tests suggest that this reduction is achieved through developing environmental strategies and increasing executive compensation incentives. Heterogeneity analyses reveal that the effect of appointed directors is more pronounced for firms with lax regional environmental regulation, in non-heavily polluting industries, with low analyst coverage, and with poor green innovation abilities. Our findings shed light on the effectiveness of mixed-ownership reform from the perspective of appointed directors and offer new implications and evidence for environmental protection and the sustainable development of enterprises in emerging markets.