Abstract
Aim The Proof-of-Work consensus mechanism is the core mechanism of the blockchain, but the existing Fork After Withholding (FAW) attack can earn more rewards by launching attacks on the mining pools under the Proof-of-Work consensus mechanism. This paper proposes a new attack model based on the FAW attack, which further increases the attacker’s reward to explore the impact of the attack method on the blockchain network and the losses caused by the attack, which is helpful for maintaining the blockchain. Methods This paper proposes a new mining attack model called the "Eclipse Fork After Withholding (EFAW) attack" by combining FAW attacks with the eclipse attack. In the EFAW attack, the attacker infiltrates the victim pool by dispatching infiltrator miners. At the same time, they isolate a portion of miners in the victim pool through eclipse attacks, intercepting the valid information transmitted by these isolated miners. The attacker selectively discards or strategically releases the information to gain extra rewards. Results In this paper, we launch an EFAW attack against a single mining pool and two mining pools, respectively, and evaluate the relative extra rewards of the attacker with theoretical analysis and Monte Carlo simulation experiments. Our experimental data indicate that this attack can earn more rewards than FAW attacks. Conclusion The experimental results demonstrate that the lower bound of earnings in the EFAW attack is higher than in FAW attacks, and it is directly proportional to the number of miners isolated by the attacker’s eclipse attack in the victim pool. This indicates that the EFAW attack poses a greater threat compared to FAW attacks, representing one of the major conclusions drawn from the study.
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