Educational adequacy and educational equality: a merging proposal

Abstract

ABSTRACT Proposals of distributive justice in childhood education are mainly divided in two camps: educational adequacy and educational equality. This paper shows that the compelling insights of both camps are complementary. I begin by distinguishing two kinds of views of educational adequacy. One identifies the thresholds of adequate education with essential capacities to be autonomous (John White) and to participate in public deliberation (Amy Gutmann). I defend the priority of these thresholds, but also their compatibility with other principles of justice that regulate educational inequalities above the thresholds. Another kind of adequacy view is posed by Elizabeth Anderson and Debra Satz. In their view, a just distribution of educational resources derives from the demands of relational equality. An adequate education should develop social, political, and civic equal relationships among children, and the adult citizens that they will become. The other camp of proposals of distributive justice in childhood education is educational equality. Its defenders, like Harry Brighouse and Colin Macleod, identify two prima facie reasons to offset inequalities in educational resources among children. I argue that these reasons are compatible with educational adequacy views. My central claim is that all-things-considered proposals of educational justice should contain the compelling insights of both camps.