Education as a Signal of Trainability: Results from a Vignette Study with Italian Employers

Abstract

Drawing on queuing theory, this study explores the relationship between education and labour market entry from the perspective of employers. On the basis of vignette study, we simulated a hiring process with a sample of recruiters and human resource managers. We analysed the role of education in the screening of applicants’ resumes for job openings in the Information, Communication, and Technology sector in the Italian labour market. Findings reveal that employers attach importance to fine-grained indicators of school performance, such as grades and study duration to formulate their hiring decisions, in line with queuing theory. However, internships are disregarded as signals. Results are explained in light of the institutional arrangements that characterize the Italian school-to-work transition system: a standardized education system, poorly specific vocational tracks, weakly developed linkages between schools and firms, a remarkably high dropout rate before study completion.