Editorial: How Best to "Go On"? Prospects for a "Modern Synthesis" in the Sciences of Mind.

Kevin Moore,John Cromby

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00766

Abstract

Editorial: How Best to "Go On"? Prospects for a "Modern Synthesis" in the Sciences of Mind.

Highlights

For some time, conceptual unity in psychology has been seen as both a scientific “holy grail” and a feared hegemonic project—see, for example Observer (1982), Kantor (1984), and Dixon (1983)
Conceptual unity in psychology has been seen as both a scientific “holy grail” and a feared hegemonic project—see, for example Observer (1982), Kantor (1984), and Dixon (1983). This may be because a focus on integration, perhaps paradoxically, may intensify various tensions within a psychology whose sub-disciplinary constitution reflects fault lines and dualisms in the organization of knowledge more generally
Our contributors explore whether such advances have helped synthesize the diverse understandings of mind within psychology

Summary

Introduction

Conceptual unity in psychology has been seen as both a scientific “holy grail” and a feared hegemonic project—see, for example Observer (1982), Kantor (1984), and Dixon (1983). We have seen new areas of theory and methods, including enactivism, embodied cognition, discursive psychology, second-person neuroscience, developmental systems theories, and a stunning growth in the neurosciences, genetics, and epigenetics. The second focuses on prospects for synthesis within specific contexts of theory, method, and practice, including reciprocity (Berra) psychiatric theory, and diagnosis (Castiglioni and Laudisa; Di Francesco and Marraffa) methods for investigating consciousness (Olivares et al.); theories of vision (Laurent) and argumentation (Lillo-Unglaube et al.).

Results

Conclusion