Econophysics of a ranked demand and supply resource allocation problem

Abstract

We present a two sided resource allocation problem, between demands and supplies, where both parties are ranked. For example, in Big Data problems where a set of different computational tasks is divided between a set of computers each with its own resources, or between employees and employers where both parties are ranked, the employees by their fitness and the employers by their package benefits. The allocation process can be viewed as a repeated game where in each iteration the strategy is decided by a meta-rule, based on the ranks of both parties and the results of the previous games. We show the existence of a phase transition between an absorbing state, where all demands are satisfied, and an active one where part of the demands are always left unsatisfied. The phase transition is governed by the ratio between supplies and demand. In a job allocation problem we find positive correlation between the rank of the workers and the rank of the factories; higher rank workers are usually allocated to higher ranked factories. These all suggest global emergent properties stemming from local variables. To demonstrate the global versus local relations, we introduce a local inertial force that increases the rank of employees in proportion to their persistence time in the same factory. We show that such a local force induces non trivial global effects, mostly to benefit the lower ranked employees.