Economics of RP–PvP Events in World of Warcraft (via the Example of Argent Dawn Server)

Abstract

This paper explores the economics of roleplaying player versus player (RP–PvP) events in World of Warcraft, on the Argent Dawn server. The RP–PvP events remain an unexamined niche in the research of massively multiplayer online roleplaying games and present a peculiar case of “anarchy” within cyberspace, being formally ungoverned by Blizzard Entertainment. To investigate this phenomenon, I construct the economic theory of RP–PvP events and hypothesize that participants can only derive utility from such events if and only if their effective time spent roleplaying is maximized. I show that to achieve this goal, roleplayers devise private rules of governance and enforce them through various means, from reputational mechanisms to aggressive monitoring of outsiders. The paper seeks to pioneer in bridging the gap between governance literature in economics and game studies by highlighting creative methods of managing complex problems of social coordination without formal supervision.